Abstract-In
Ⅰ．INTRODUCTION
As the development of information technology and internet, more and more customers choose to buy things from on-line shops, because of their convenience and abundant production types. According to the statistics from Chinese B2B Research Center, the total trading volume of Chinese electronic commerce market researched 4,500 billion CNY in 2010, and the number of net shopping customers surpass 0.13 billion CNY in China. The online channel through internet has become one of the most important distribution channels of many companies, and is still developing at an extraordinary speed.
Online channels bring out the Drop-Shipping channel, where the online retailers get customer orders and manufactures undertake the task of production and delivery, as shown in Fig. 1 . In the Drop-shipping channel, suppliers are responsible for both storage and delivery, while retailers only have to concentrate on marketing. Direct delivery channels can not only cause the inventory pooling and scale economies effect, but also increase the categories of products on sale [1] . As a result, the order fulfillment pattern of Drop-shipping is very popular in the electronic commerce field, and arouses much attention from many corporations. A survey said 56% of manufacturers received a Drop-shipping request from online retailers, and among them, 30.6% treat Drop-shipping as their main order fulfillment pattern, meanwhile, another 44.5% consider it as an important alternative [2] . Compared to the traditional two-level online delivery channel, one distinguishing characteristic of Drop-shipping channel is that manufacturers contact customers directly, and by controlling the delivery reliability, manufacturers can influence the demand of the channel, moreover, the delivery service plays a critical part in customer satisfaction [3] [4] . Delivery reliability indicates the ratio of the number of deliveries meeting the requirements of customers to the total number of deliveries in a period [4] . Based on the hypothesis that the delivery reliability of manufacturers and sales efforts of retailers can both influence the decisions of customers, this research is aimed to found out the inefficiency of this new supply chain, and then the coordination mechanism.
Ⅱ．LITERATURE REVIEW
As the application of Drop-shipping becomes wider and wider, relevant researches increase, which mainly focus on the application and coordination mechanism design of Drop-shipping channel, the sale channel or inventory location choice.
For the retailer, Drop-shipping has significant advantages which include lower holding, handling, and shortage costs. In other hand, Drop-shipping increased per-unit cost, made the delivery more difficulty when a single order involves products from different manufacturers, and may caused longer delivery times.
Khouja [6] [7] design an optimal mix strategy and two (Q, R) inventory models in order to capture the advantages of dropping and avoid many of its shortcomings. For retailer, Bailey et al. [2] consider how dynamically to manage inventory to fill the order and put forward the optimal channel strategy for retailers, by analyzing the change of their market share and product popularity. Ayanso et al.
[8] also research how to use Drop-shipping as an order fulfillment option. They developed a Monte Carlo simulation model to found that retailers fulfilled advanced orders through the traditional channel, while lower level orders through the Drop-shipping channel.
Netessine et al. [9] found that the supply chain under the drop-shipping arrangement benefits from risk pooling because the inventory for multiple retailers is stocked at the same location, and a mixed channel could be made by combining the Drop-shipping with the traditional channel.
Combine traditional channel, affiliate programs and drop-shipping, Xiao et al. [10] analyzed the optimal inventory strategy and admission policies for a "Clicks-and-Bricks" retailer that sold through its own physical and online stores by means of affiliate programs and drop-shipping agreement. Hovelaque et al. [11] assess different forms of existing organizations:
"store-picking", "drop-shipping" and "dedicated warehouse-picking" by using a newsboy order policy model and note the impact of some paremeters on inventory and flow management policies throughout the supply chain, particularly those linked to the size of the internet market in relation to traditional market size market demand hazards.
As the inventory decision and stock keeping responsibility transferring to manufacturer when supply chain choose Drop-shipping only, Lee et al. [12] found that retailers' profit might reduce while manufacturers' might increase in the Drop-shipping channel, by comparing the payoffs of retailers and manufactures in both traditional and Drop-shipping channel.
In the coordination mechanism design aspect, Netessine et al. [13] proposed a new coordination scheme, where a compensation plan was used and the wholesaler subsidized a part of the retailer's marketing expenses;
Gan et al. [14] realized that commitment-penalty contracts could effectively solve the inefficiency aroused by asymmetric information in Drop-shipping supply chain.
Above-mentioned research are all based on the assumption that demands of customers are exogenetic or they depend on sales efforts, while ignore the impact on online delivery reliability through internet. Yao et al. [1] considered the impact on customer decision from delivery reliability, and analyzed information sharing was effective in coordinating the supply chain, however, they didn't involve the influence of sales efforts to demands of customers. Based on the former research on the decision characteristic of online channel customer, this article analyses the efficiency and coordination mechanism of Drop-shipping channel, under the condition that the customer decision is influenced by both sales effort and delivery reliability. 
Ⅳ．MODEL ANALYZES
In order to set a benchmark, this paper supposes that the manufacturer and retailer are integrated as a firm, and all decisions are made by the firm. And this decision scenario is a sublimate scenario, under which the profit of the supply chain gets the optimal outcome. And in order to differentiate the decentralized scenario in the next 
The first order conditions of r A and m A on (3) and (4), we can obtain the optimal sales effort * 
Substituting equations (5) and (6) in to (1) and (2), we obtain the following equations,
A. The centralized scenario
In order to set a benchmark, this paper supposes that the manufacturer and retailer are integrated as a firm, and all decisions are made by the firm. And this decision scenario is a sublimate scenario, under which the profit of the supply chain gets the optimal outcome. And in order to differentiate the decentralized scenario in the next segment, this paper uses 1 s as a superscript stands for the centralized scenario, and 2 s for the decentralized one. Hence, the profit function of the supply chain is as follows, = − + + − − 
The first order conditions of r A and m A on 
B. The decentralized scenario
In the decentralized scenario, the manufacturer and retailer make their decisions according to their own profit functions. And the profit functions are as follows, = − + + − 
The backward induction is adopted to solve the game between the manufacturer and retailer. In the second stage, the manufacturer and retailer decide the optimal delivery reliability and sales effort, respectively, under a given wholesale price 
With the response function of the second stage, in the first stage, the manufacturer determines the optimal wholesale price for its unit product to the retailer. Submit equations (11) and (12) 
Let equation (13) to be zero, i.e., from the first order condition, we obtain the optimal wholesale price,
To make the model analysis sense, according to the assumption: < < Submitting (15) into (11) and (12), the following equations exists,
And then from equations (1), (9), (10), (15), (16) and (17), there are,
Through the analyses of the centralized and decentralized scenarios, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The optimal sales effort, the optimal delivery reliability, the production demand and the total profit of the supply chain are all greater in the centralized scenario, i.e., the manufacturer and retailer are both free riders in the drop-shopping supply chain.
Ⅴ．CONTRACT DESIGN
Under the decentralize scenario, the Drop-shipping can not achieve the optimization, existing room for improvement. So as to coordinate manufacture and retailer, and implement Pareto optimality, in this part, we try to discuss a contract.
In general, quantity discount and compensate are used for solving the supply chain coordination. We also resolve the free riding problem in dint of these two ways.
A. Quantity Discount Contract
Through the quantity discount contract, the retailer can obtain some price discount depend on how much product bought from the manufacture. More quantity ordered by the retailer, much less price the retailer will get. Therefore the manufacture can inspire the retailer. Quantity discount contract is composed of two parts: fixed wholesaler price and dynamic favorable price depend on order quantity.
In the traditional supply chain contract designing, quantity discount contract is generally used to arm at the demand uncertainty. In Drop-shipping channel, due to manufacture bears all the demand uncertainty, the quantity discount has another effect on the supply chain.
The discount could encourage retailer enhance her sale effort which will increase the market demand and increase the order quantity of retailer. So we choose discount quantity contract to solve free ridding in Drop-shipping supply chain.
This 
The backward induction is adopted to solve the game between the manufacturer and retailer. We can obtain following conclusion.
Proposition 2: The free ridding of Drop-shipping supply chain can not be solved by quantity discount contract.
Prove: in the second stage, according to the first order conditions, we obtain the optimal sales effort of the retailer and the optimal delivery reliability of the manufacturer as follows,
With the response function of the second stage, in the first stage, the manufacturer determines the optimal wholesale price for its unit product to the retailer. Submit equations (23) and (24) 
Submit equations (25) and (26) 
Therefore, the quantity discount contract does not achieve Pareto optimality.
B. Combination Mechanism
According to the part 4, we know both manufacture and retailer are free riders. Using quantity discount contract achieve unidirectional excitation only, absolutely quantity discount contract can not solve Drop-shipping free ridding problem. We will design a bi-direction excitation mechanism to coordination the supply chain.
When manufacture attends to acquire customers demand in Drop-shipping supply chain, to inspire the manufacture and retailer simultaneously, we combine the delivery reliability compensation with quantity discount contract.
Proposition 3: The combination mechanism of delivery reliability compensation and quantity discount contract solves free ridding of Drop-shipping supply chain and achieve Pareto optimality.
Prove: The backward induction is adopted to solve the game between the manufacturer and retailer. In the second stage, the manufacturer and retailer decide the optimal delivery reliability and sales effort, respectively, under a given wholesale price 
With the response function of the second stage, in the first stage, the manufacturer determines the optimal wholesale price for its unit product to the retailer. Submit equations (30) and (31) 
Submit equation (32) into (30) and (31), and let equations (23) and (24) 
Comparing equations (35), (36) and (37) with (5), (6) and (8), we should know the combination mechanism of delivery reliability compensation and quantity discount contract achieves Pareto optimality. On the other hand, to make sure that both manufacture and retailer increase profit and accept the new contract, we can induct a fixed compensation f between manufacture and retailer. In some case, f expresses the compensation from manufacture to retailer, and in some case, the other way round. That depends on the profit change of original contract and new contract. We do not discuss in this article. The online channel provides the firms with wider market space, and has become an important distribution channel of many firms. Having a boosting development, it's playing an significant role in the business activity. As a kind of the online channel, the Drop-shipping online channel has been applied broadly because of scale economies and risk aggregation effect. Based on the separated stages of the order obtainment and fulfillment in the Drop-shipping channel, this article analyzed its coordination mechanism.
By comparing the decentralized and centralized decision making, we found free riders were common and that both manufacturers and retailers were possible to behave as free riders. Then, we discovered that using quantity discount alone couldn't solve the coordination problem, because both manufacturers and retailers deeded incentive contract. As a result, this article designed a combination mechanism of quantity discount and compensation mechanism as to guarantee manufacturers a safe delivery in order to achieve the coordination of the supply chain.
The preconditions of this article are certain demands, certain prices and information symmetry. Further research will remove these preconditions and consider more complex scenarios.
